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1. Introduction1
 
How much legislation at the member state level is affected by European legislation?  
According to several leading scholars, at least 80 percent of member states’ legislation is 
derived from European legislation, suggesting a very high impact of the EU on national 
legislative and administrative systems. But is this true? Are member states really so much 
affected by European legislation? Have national states really ‘devolved’ so much of their 
legislative discretion to the supranational level? We have grounded reason to doubt the figures 
that are uttered in political debates and the media. A recent Danish study found that less than 
30 percent of all Danish national legislation in force on 31 July 2003 did actually have a 
European directive as its source (Blom-Hansen & Christensen 2003). The policy area most-
affected by Europeanisation, agriculture, had the highest score of ‘only’ 27,3 %. Although 
different in certain respects, a similar pattern emerges from a British study on the impact of 
European legislation on national legislation (Page 1998). Given the public opinion about the 
impact of ‘Brussels’ on national administrative systems, these findings urge students of 
Europeanisation to examine the impact of Europeanisation in more systematic and empirical 
ways.  
Our study is part of a joint research project between researchers from the universities 
of Aarhus (Denmark), Mannheim (Germany) and our institute in Utrecht (Netherlands). To be 
more precise, the latter two projects are replications of the Danish study. In the light of this 
project, we are interested in the impact of European legislation on national legislation across a 
diverse group of countries. The Netherlands is a founding member state of the EU and it is a 
unitary decentralised parliamentary system. Denmark is also a unitary decentralised 
parliamentary system, but it entered the EEC in 1973 and has maintained a sceptic position 
towards European integration. Austria, the third country in this project, entered the EU in 
1995 and, above all, is federal system. Besides assessing the ‘80% thesis’ one of our main 
aims is to examine the effects of varying institutional settings on the observed variation in 
national legislative autonomy between various European countries. At this stage, our aims are 
rather modest, as the Dutch study’s findings are preliminary and the Austrian study is still 
underway. We present some first observations for the Netherlands and compare these with 
those of the Danish and British studies on a preliminary basis.  
The structure of paper is as follows. First, in section 2, we offer a brief overview of 
European implementation literature. We argue that this literature has tried to answer two 
kinds of questions: how fast do member states implement European directives and to what 
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extent do they adapt to them? The question how much member states are Europeanised is not 
as thoroughly researched as one expects on the basis of the widespread claim that 80% of 
national policies have their origin on the supranational level. In section 3 we compile these 
claims and critically discuss the different implicit assumptions that exist about the ‘impact’ 
and the empirical evidence that is available about legislative impact. Section 4 then explains 
our methods and describes our databases, and section 5 presents findings for the Dutch case. 
Next to some general descriptive data on the directives and national rules in our database, the 
data we present show how the EU directives in our database are allocated over ministerial 
portfolios, the legislative instruments used to transpose them, and of course the impact figure 
for the separate sectors. The paper ends with a conclusion and a discussion of caveats (section 
6). 
 
2. Europeanisation through The Implementation of European Directives 
 
Europeanisation studies examine how and to what extent European integration affects the 
policies, politics and, polity of national member states (Richardson 1996; Peters 1997; Börzel 
& Risse 2003).2 With the rise of Europeanisation studies, the main focus of EU-research is no 
longer limited to studies on the influence of member states on the evolution of supranational 
institutions, but has shifted to studies of the impact of European supranational institutions and 
decision-making processes on national states. This shift is partly welcomed as an expression 
of the maturity of the European Union, having become a fully fledged political system that is 
no longer the extension or instrument of its constituent members, like it is depicted in the 
liberal intergovernmentalist paradigm (Moravcsik 1993). On the other hand, the growing 
predominance of the domestic impact perspective is perhaps also an indication that the dusk 
has settled and ‘Europeanisation’ is being looked upon as another manifestation of the 
internationalisation of national politics (Gourevitch 1978; Katzenstein 1985; Goetz 2001; 
Mair 2004).3  
 European integration can affect the policies, politics, and polities of national member 
states in a variety of ways. Some of these ways are informal and indirect, for example through 
policy convergence and policy mimicry or through voluntary agreements, such as the Bologna 
agreements to uniform the higher education systems. Also through the free travel of goods, 
services and persons within the EU there has occurred a gradual convergence of cultures, 
tastes and life styles (Mair 2004). Many other ways are more direct and formalized. EU 
policymaking is highly legalistic and much of the European integration has been brought 
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about through legal instruments: directly binding regulations, directives, decisions, 
recommendations, and of course the case law of the European Court of Justice. 
The implementation of European directives is perhaps the most popular branch of 
Europeanisation studies (Olsen 2002). The focus in the different fields of impact studies 
varies from examining the timeliness and correctness of the implementation of directives, i.e. 
the incorporation of EEC directives in national legislation and estimating ‘the implementation 
deficit’ (Siedentopf & Ziller 1988; Tallberg 2002; Mastenbroek 2003), to to what extent 
national policies, politics, and institutions have adapted to those directives that have actually 
been transposed, as well as the mechanisms through which they have been affected (Knill & 
Lehmkuhl 2002; Featherstone & Radaelli 2003). Both these strands have in common that they 
focus exclusively on how Europe ‘hits’ national states, but they differ in the stage of 
implementation where they focus on. Schematically: 
 
 
Figure 1. A schematic representation of European implementation literature 
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The main difference between implementation deficit studies and domestic impact studies is 
that the former primarily focuses on the success and failure of transposition measured in 
timeliness and correctness of transposition, and addresses the causes of the implementation 
deficit. Domestic impact studies examine, once the directive is transposed, successfully or 
not, the impact measured in the degree of adaptation at various levels of the national state.  
The starting point of implementation deficit studies is the legal requirement that 
member states of the European Union, for the sake of harmonization of the European political 
and economic space, should implement European directives on time and do such correctly. 
The main criteria – the requirements set up by the ECJ – for the transposition of European 
directives are whether member states have incorporated or transposed directives (a) on time, 
that is as specified in the directive and (b) the directive is transposed by a national legal 
instruments that has a binding legal effect (Mastenbroek 2002).  
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A pioneering study on the domestic impact of Europeanisation, is the comparative 
research project edited by Siedentopf and Ziller (1988: Vol. 1, 2). Through clearly delineating 
different phases in the European policy process,4 this study identified formal and informal 
processes of European policy-making, with a special reference to the performance of the 
individual member states in successfully ‘incorporating’ and enforcing European directives in 
their national political systems. Their main hypotheses were that implementation of EU 
legislation is a process highly influenced by the complex multi-level and inter-organizational 
nature of its structure, national politico-administrative cultures, and policy styles (see also 
Peters 1997; Richardson 1996; Hooghe & Marks 2001). As far as their observations on the 
process of incorporation are concerned, they discerned substantial variation between the 
member states in delegating the implementation of European policies to national actors, the 
procedures for incorporating, i.e. transposing, European directives, and the incorporation 
performance. 
However thoroughly, the studies that were produced under the auspices of these 
authors remained limited to a sample of 17 directives. It has had follow-ups in a number of 
more recent studies on the implementation deficit. The EC, moreover, keeps periodic 
scoreboards tracking the delayed or on time transpositions of directives. It also provides lists 
of infringement procedures against member states that have failed to implement the directives 
on time. The Commission and with it several researchers have in this respect found substantial 
‘implementation deficits’ (Bursens 2002; Lampinen and Uusikylä 1998; Mastenbroek 2003). 
The most comprehensive and rigorous of these studies is that of Mastenbroek (2003). She 
studied 229 directives enacted between 1995 and 1998 and measured the timeliness of the 
transposition of directives in the Netherlands. She concludes that a serious implementation 
deficit existed in the Netherlands, because 60 percent of the directives in her sample were 
transposed too late. Her analysis corroborates findings of Bursens (2002) who compared the 
transposition performance of Belgium and Denmark.  
Domestic impact studies take adaptation as its main dependent variable. This strand is 
concerned with what happens after a directive is transposed. It focuses on the effects of the 
implementation of directives on national states, and on whether European integration means 
convergence. Domestic impact in this strand thus means first and foremost how national states 
are responding to European policies and to what extent these states’ policies are converging 
towards a common point. The growing body of literature on this aspect of Europeanisation 
has generated substantial insights into how and to what extent European integration has ‘hit’ 
member states, as well as a set of distinctive conceptual tools with which to study these 
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processes (Cowles et al 2001; Knill & Lehmkuhl 2002; Börzel & Risse 2003; Radaelli & 
Featherstone 2003).  
Europeanisation can hit national states at three dimensions: policy, politics, and polity 
(Börzel & Risse 2003). The Europeanisation of national policy areas is the consequence of the 
implementation of European policies. European policies can either be formal European 
legislation on areas that are formal part of the acquis communitaire, or fairly informal 
processes of negotiation and agreement on issues that are not formal part of the acquis, i.e. 
codes of conduct, voluntary agreements, benchmarking etcetera (Zito et al 2003; Mair 2004: 
341). The impact of European integration on domestic politics and polities, it is claimed, is far 
less researched than Europe’s policy impact (Sciarini et al 2004), but there is no doubt among 
students of European politics that the impact of European integration on these dimensions is 
no less substantial than at the more basic policy level (Bergman & Damgaard 2000; 
Holzhacker 2002).  European integration is said to decidedly affect processes of societal 
interest formation, aggregation, and representation (Börzel & Risse 2003). The same is 
claimed about the EU’s effect on the polity as it changes relationships between the branches 
of the state, i.e. the judiciary (Conant 2001), between territorial units of the state and the state 
and supranational institutions (Hooghe & Marks 2001), the national administrative systems 
(Kassim et al 2002; Hanf & Soetendorp 1998; Page & Wouters 1995; Knill 2001).5
In this brief overview of Europeanisation studies we could not do justice to the rich 
variety of studies dealing with this important issue. The literature is growing by the day and 
the field harbours edgy theoretical debates. Our main point should however be clear: the main 
focus of both the implementation deficit and adaptation studies is the question of how Europe 
has hit the national member state and what the consequences have been for, respectively, the 
timeliness and correctness of implementation, and the national policies, politics and the polity. 
One of the striking conclusions of this literature survey is that none has examined the relative 
impact of European legislation on national legislation. One of the big questions in public and 
scholarly debate is still left unanswered and is instead left to become a myth, the 80% myth. 
Instead of asking how or how fast member states become Europeanized, we pose the question 
how much European member states have become Europeanized. 
 
3. The Impact of European Directives on National Legislation 
 
3.1 The 80%-Myth6
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The Europeanisation literature is haunted by the persistent assertion that 80% of all policies of 
member states is the result of European policies. This figure is generally ascribed to the 
former President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, who in 1985 proposed the 
creation of a Single Market in Europe, proclaimed that 80% of the internal market of the 
member states would become governed by European legislation. Amazingly, this claim was 
unscrupulously taken over and repeated by a large number of students of the European Union. 
Hix (1999), for example, asserts that ‘In fact, the EU sets over 80 per cent of rules governing 
the exchange of goods services and capital in the member states' markets’ (p. 3). Later, he 
claims that ‘Approximately 80 per cent of all social, economic and environmental regulation 
applicable in the member states is adopted through the EU policy process’ (p. 211). In both 
instances there is no reference to a source or research where these assertions can be 
substantiated. This is the more problematic as his claims are taken over by other scholars 
(Richardson 2001: 4).7  
Some students are somewhat more careful, but the 80% figure still recurs in their 
accounts. Börzel and Risse (2003), two leading scholars of the domestic impact school of 
Europeanisation studies, confine their claim to specific sectors: ‘The Europeanisation of some 
policy areas, such as environment and agriculture, reached a degree where more than 80% of 
existing policies are made at the European level’ (Börzel & Risse 2003 [in working paper on 
p 3]). Another recent example, confined only to the Dutch environmental policy area, is the 
‘estimation’ that ‘for 80%, Dutch environmental policy is effectively determined by Brussels’ 
(Dijstelbloem et al 2004: 103). Most cautious, finally, has been Majone (1996:57): 
 
according to some estimates, today only 20 to 25 per cent of the legal texts applicable 
in France are produced by the parliament or the government in complete autonomy, 
that is, without any previous consultation in Brussels (Conseil d' Etat 1993)8. 
Presumably, an analogous situation prevails in all the other member states. 
 
According to these authors, national policy-making in EU member states is a mere shadow of 
policy-making at the supranational level. Apart from the lack of empirical evidence, a 
problem with these assertions is that there is no clear definition of what is meant by the ‘EU’ 
or ‘EU policies’. Clearly, a case can be made that the EU has a very large impact on national 
policies if all those ‘products’ of the European integration, formal and informal, are taken into 
account. That is, if we follow a very broad definition of Europeanisation. There is no dispute 
that, as Mair (2004) for example wrote, there is a convergence of cultures, life styles and 
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tastes within the European Union, and that many societal and economic problems that are not 
regulated by the acquis communitaire are taken up voluntarily by the national governments 
with the EU, through a host of so-called “new policy instruments” (Zito et al 2003).   
But if we read the claims above more closely, it is clear that with the impact of the 
European Union is meant the impact of formal legal outputs of the various institutions of the 
European Union. Meant are the combined effects of regulations, directives, decisions, 
recommendations, and the decisions and jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. If we 
confine ourselves to this more narrow form of Europeanisation, we agree that for certain 
policy areas, e.g. agriculture, it is likely that the combined impact of, say, regulations and 
directives yield a very high impact factor. But then again, there exists no empirical evidence 
that this impact is about 80 per cent, and that certain other policy areas have a lower impact 
degree, or that each member state is affected to the same extent. What is needed therefore, is a 
more specific operationalization of what is exactly meant by impact, followed by an empirical 
assessment of the degree of impact. This is, however, an enormous task. In this study we 
chose to limit ourselves to measure the degree of legislative impact that is the result of the 
implementation of European directives. By measuring the impact generated by directives on 
national legislation we are not able to conclude anything about how other formal and informal 
outputs of the process of European integration influence member states.  
 
3.2 Recent Studies on the National Impact of Directives 
 
Two studies precede our work in measuring the legislative impact of European directives on 
the single member states’ legislative process. The first study is conducted by Page on the 
United Kingdom (Page 1998), the second focused on Denmark (Blom-Hansen & Christensen 
2004). Our study will replicate the Danish study in order to generate comparable findings. 
Although carried out in different time periods (UK 1987-1997; DK July 2003) their findings 
convincingly rebut the 80%-claim. Page found for the UK that European legislation is 
responsible for 15.8 % of all Statutory Instruments, the most common legislative procedure 
through which European legislation in the UK is transposed. The Danish study measured 
overall that 9.6 % of all primary and secondary laws in Denmark had a European origin. 
There were nevertheless major variations per sector within as well as between the countries. 
In both countries, the policy sector ‘hit’ most by European legislation was, as could be 
expected, agriculture. Still, in the UK 51 percent of the agricultural SIs had a European origin, 
whereas in Denmark the overall (primary and secondary) legislative impact of the EU on 
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agriculture was not higher than 27 percent. Given the fact that the studies measured different 
time periods we must be cautious in making comparative assessments on the basis of these 
figures. Nevertheless, the results of both studies seriously question the claimed impact of 
European legislation on national legislation.  
However, we aim to go beyond a mere debunking of the ‘80%-myth’. The 
fundamental question is what the actual impact figures actually mean. Equally interesting are 
the implications for theory-testing and hypothesis building this kind of study will generate. A 
quantitative and comparative assessment of European legislative impact allows us to go 
beyond mere ‘mechanism’ studies and offers opportunities to assess more rigorously the 
‘goodness of fit’-hypothesis that so far has been tested merely case-wise. Our study, for 
example, generates an overall view of the extent to which different policy sectors went 
through an institutional compliance process, allowing impact analysis to go beyond the ‘usual 
suspect’ sectors such as environment and transport. Moreover, if future studies will find that 
the cross-national European legislative impact is low, this may affect current and past 
thinking on the nature and future of European integration. In any case, especially at the 
sectoral level, we expect to find substantial variation in the degree of Europeanisation 
between different sectors within the same country as well as between similar sectors across 
the member states.  
 
4. Methods and data 
 
Before we explicate our methods and databases, we briefly describe the general approach of 
our study through a brief account of the Danish and British studies, which are basically the 
same. Both use the available national and or European databases to identify all directives that 
have been implemented through a national rule. In the end both studies divide the number of 
national rules that implement EU directives by the total number of national rules present in 
the national database. There are several notable differences as well. The British study uses 
HMSO’s Statutory Instruments on CD ROM (Context 1997) as its single and main database, 
whereas the Danish study couples CELEX, which contains European directives with 
references to the national rule which implements them, and the national legal database 
Retsinformation for identifying all national rules. Both studies however acknowledge the 
imperfectness of CELEX. According to Page, CELEX omits a substantial number of statutory 
instruments, especially those that amend, apply, or are a consequence of national rules that 
implement European legislation (Page 1998: 804). Blom-Hansen and Christensen (2003: 
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143), too, have noted the mistakes in CELEX, but considered them as too minor to have 
biased their measurement. 
 In our Dutch study we use similar databases for identifying European legislation and 
the national rules that implement these, and a database for identifying all national rules that 
were in force at 31 July 2003. As for European legislation, we use the Dutch Europmaat 
database. This database is built and maintained by the former State Printing Office, the now 
privatized SDU Uitgevers, and consists of a coupling of CELEX and the Register on Dutch 
Implementing Rules (Register Uitvoeringsregelingen Nederland). This register is developed 
and maintained by the T.M.C. Asser Institute, which is an ‘Institute for Private and Public 
International Law, International Commercial Arbitration and European Law’. The coupling of 
these databases circumvents the shortcomings of the CELEX database and is seemingly more 
accurate. The database we use for national legislation is also published by SDU, the SDU 
Wettenbank. This database contains all national rules, and enables searches for rules in force 
since 1 January 1995. It also allows for distinguishing between ministerial portfolios and 
types of legislation. 
As already mentioned, our study is a replication of the Danish study. Having identified 
all the European directives that were in force on July 31, 2003, we coded for each directive 
the date on which it was enacted, the European institution that enacted it, the policy area in 
which it was issued, and the fact whether the directive was an original piece of legislation or 
that it revised or amended a directive already in force. As for policy area, we started from 
Eur-lex’s classification system, which is also reproduced in Europmaat, for identifying policy 
areas. Currently, the classification system contains twenty main policy categories.9 These 
categories are further refined in subpolicy areas, a feature which makes it possible to fine tune 
the different policy groupings, caused by regularly changing portfolio allocations, at the 
national level. In addition to these official categories, we also coded for the type of regulatory 
function of the directive.10
For each directive then, we coded the national rule through which it is implemented. In 
the Dutch legal system, directives can be implemented through four different types of national 
rule (see Mastenbroek 2002). The first type of national rule is statutory or primary law. These 
are enacted by parliament and cabinet together and send for scrutiny to the Council of State 
(Raad van State). The second type of national rule through which directives can be transposed 
are orders in council (Algemene Maatregel van Bestuur) or royal decrees (Koninklijk Besluit). 
These rules are generally binding acts, like primary laws, and need approval from the Council 
of State, with the difference that the adoption of orders in council are delegated to the cabinet, 
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either through constitutional provisions or primary laws. Third come ministerial decrees. 
These are only binding to a limited extent and do not need scrutiny from the Council of State. 
Finally, a number of administrative authorities, i.e. Public Bodies (Openbare Lichamen voor 
Beroep en Bestuur), have the (delegated) authority to issue orders. For each rule, the date of 
enactment and the ministerial department or administrative authority under which they are 
administered are coded. Having identified the national rules, the total number of national and 
specific rules that implements the directives is counted and compared to the total number of 
national and specific rules that are in force at 31 July 2003. Thus we can assess which part of 
the national rules that are in force have their origin in a European directive. 
What kind of impact do our data allow us to observe? First of all, of course, we are 
able to calculate the relative impact of European directives on national legislation. As 
discussed above, this will allow us to assess the degree of Europeanisation, as far as 
legislation concerns, of a founding member of the European Union and ‘test’ 80%-thesis. We 
can furthermore test the impact for the country as a whole, but also assess the relative impact 
at sector level in order to distinguish the impact degrees across different policy sectors. 
Second, our data also allow us to reconstruct the legislative process through which European 
directives are implemented in the Netherlands. In addition, our data will also reveal the 
different legislative traditions that prevail among the Dutch ministerial departments. Finally, 
we can observe the degree of coordination between different ministerial departments that is 
required to implement European legislation, as our database contains findings on the number 
of ministerial departments that were involved in the implementation of European legislation.  
 When we juxtapose our data next to the Danish and (later) the Austrian databases, we 
are able to extend towards a comparative analysis of legislative impact. First, the above data 
are also available for Denmark, which allows us to proceed by cross-national cross-sector 
analyses of legislative impact. These findings allow us to measure of what can be termed a 
country’s or sector’s ‘legislative autonomy’ from European legislation. Second, these data 
also allow to map national and sectoral styles of legislation. In the UK, for example, 92 % of 
all European legislation is implemented through statutory instruments, i.e. secondary or 
delegated legislation (Page 1998: 804). The Danish figures display a more mixed picture of 
primary and secondary legislation, albeit that delegated legislation, i.e. bekendtgørelser, are 
more often used than laws (Blom-Hansen and Christensen 2004: 68). 
  
5. Findings 
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5.1 EU directives and policy areas 
 
Our database contains 1367 directives in force on 31 July 2003. More than half of these are 
‘new’ directives, i.e. directives addressing a specific issue for the first time (744 directives, 
54.4%); the remaining are ‘revision’ directives: they are enacted with the purpose of revising 
(provisions within) directives in force. To measure national impact figures, we have filtered 
the latter from the dataset. In the majority of the cases, revisions of existing directives usually 
change marginally the content of the initial directives and therefore hardly exert a material 
impact on the substances of the rules and subsequent policies at the national level. We are 
aware that we herewith risk missing substantial changes on national rules that are the result of 
revisions of existing directives, but the number of significant revisions will be small. Of the 
‘new’ directives that were in force on July 2003, the Council issued the vast majority. The 
Council alone was responsible for 580 directives (78%), another 65 directives (8.7%) were 
issued by the Council in co-decision with the European Parliament. The Commission is 
responsible for the remaining 99 or 13.3% of the new or initial directives in force on July 31, 
2003.   
  
-- Figure 1 about here –   
 
Figure 1, displays the directives according to EU policy areas. With 166 directives 
(22.3 %), EU agricultural policy has the largest share, directly followed by Industrial policy 
and internal market (160 directives, 21.5%). With directives on the free movement of services 
and right of establishment in third place (111, 14.9%), it becomes clear that rules pertaining to 
economic regulation are dominant in our database. Directives on workers and social affairs on 
the one hand and the protection of the environment, consumers, and health represent only 
26% of all the directives in force.  
 
5.2 EU policy areas and national jurisdictions 
 
Directives can be implemented in various ways through various institutional actors. There is 
no automatic match between the EU policy areas and the national portfolios. Directives often 
touch upon the jurisdiction of several ministries, which can cause delays in the transposition 
process (Mastenbroek 2003:378). Our 744 initial directives were transposed by 3187 national 
rules. The majority of these directives is implemented by one or two rules (respectively, 221 
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and 136 driectives); one directive was implemented by no less than 38 national rules.11 Figure 
2 shows how much of these transposition rules each ministry has produced. We see that about 
23% of these transposition rules (728) has been produced by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Nature Management and Fisheries, followed by the Ministry of Traffic and Waterworks (600, 
19%) and the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports (417, 13%). This means that roughly 
just three ministries produce half of all transposition rules. The chart shows that the 
jurisdictional ‘homes’ of a quite an amount of transposition rules is missing (390, 12%). This 
figure can largely be attributed to missing information concerning the ministerial bases of 
transposition rules Europmaat.  
 
-- Figure 2 about here –   
 
 Table 1 lists the distribution of transposition rules over various national ministries. 
Three observations are possible. First, table 1 shows how directives enter the national domain. 
There is quite a variation between EU policy areas whose directives affect legislative 
processes across a number of national portfolios and EU policy areas where directives are 
more or less confined to one or two national portfolios. Especially, environmental directives 
and directives pertaining to industrial policy and the internal market have cross-sectoral or 
cross-jurisdictional impact at the national level. 
Second, the table shows how well national jurisdictions are fine-tuned to European 
policy areas. Unfortunately, we lack longitudinal data to check whether there has occurred an 
adaptation of national portfolio allocations to EU policy area designations, but such data 
could reveal how national governments deemed this ‘fit’ as an important factor for the 
coordination of EU policies: the more fit, the more easy becomes the coordination of EU 
policies (cf. Mastenbroek 2003). A nearly perfect match exists between EU’s transport 
directives and the Dutch Ministry of Traffic and Waterworks: responsible for about 90 percent 
of all transport related transposition rules, EU transport directives are clearly the competence 
of this ministry. A smaller domain but with a more perfect fit between supranational and 
national jurisdictions is that of tax policy, as virtually all of the directives in this domain 
(99%) are implemented by the Ministry of Finance. A quite a good match exists between 
EU’s agricultural directives and the Ministry of Agriculture. However, the Ministry of Health, 
Welfare and Sports is responsible for about 20 percent of the agricultural transposition rules, 
an observation which we can ascribe to (increased importance of) issues of food safety and 
(consumer) health.  
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 -- Table 1 about here -- 
 
 A final observation this table enables is that it offers an approximate indication of how 
many Europeanised sub-fields are sheltered by the different ministries. Ministries that appear 
several times in the table, but under different EU policy areas are apparently responsible for 
different areas that are more or less affected by European policymaking. In our case, we see 
that the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Traffic and Waterworks appear three times 
each as the most affected ministry. Finance has the lead in tax policy, customs union and free 
movement of goods, and the free movement of services and right of establishment,12 and 
Traffic and Waterworks is ranked as the most affected ministry in transport policy, industrial 
policy and internal market, and competition policy. It is an interesting fact, given the official 
role of the Ministry of Economic Affairs as the national coordinator of the EU economic 
policies, that this ministry, except in the energy domain, is not the most affected Dutch 
ministry in the economically most important EU policy areas. In fact, it is the Traffic 
department that has the highest number of appearances in the overall top-3 (six times). This 
implies that on July 31, 2003, this ministry compared to other ministries sheltered the most 
and significantly EU-affected jurisdictions of Dutch central government. 
 
 5.3 The transposition of EU directives 
 
Our database does reveal the legislative techniques used to implement EU directives (Table 
2a). The main observation here is which legal instruments the Dutch parliament apparently 
‘prefers’ to transpose European directives with. Table 2a is clear: the majority of European 
directives are implemented by a ministerial decree (45.5%). This is interesting as this means 
that the implementation of about the half of ‘European’ rules belongs to the discretionary 
authority of individual ministers.  In only 11 % of the cases, transposition occurs through 
forma law, and in one-third of the cases (31%), transposition occurs through a royal decree, 
meaning by the Dutch cabinet. A typical Dutch legal instrument forms the PBO decree. These 
decrees are issued by Statutory Trade Associations (van Waarden 2002) to bind their 
members (e.g. producer groups, firms and trade unions) in mainly industrial and agricultural 
sectors. Circulars, announcements (bekendmaking), covenant are grouped under ‘Others’. In 
sum: leaving aside what this implies for the parliamentary control of government’s 
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implementation of EU policies, our findings clearly show that about 90% of the transposition 
of EU directives takes place by legislative delegation. 
 
-- Table 2a about here -- 
 
 The Dutch central government departments were once referred to as the ‘fourteen legal 
families’. A uniform approach to legal production is lacking and each department has its own 
distinct preferences for a mix of legal instruments. Table 2b13 presents the types of legal 
instruments used by the thirteen departments that existed in July 2003. Overall, the table 
shows, more than half of all departments use ministerial decrees more frequently than formal 
laws and royal decrees. The champion of ministerial decrees is the Ministry of Health, 
Welfare and Sports (58.3%), followed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management 
and Fisheries (57.1%) and the Ministry of Traffic and Waterworks (56.3%). The Ministry of 
Education, Culture and Sciences is the only ministry that has used predominantly laws (even 
more than another instrument) to transpose its directives (34.3%), and is followed by the 
Ministry of Justice (34.3%) and the Ministry of Finance (30.6%).  
 These findings match to a large extent with the findings of De Jong and Herweijer 
(2004). In their study of central governmental rule production in the Netherlands, they found 
that ministries of Agriculture and Traffic and Waterworks were indeed the ministries with not 
only the highest production level of rules, but specifically of ministerial decrees. Our finding 
with regard to the Ministry of Justice matches also, as their research found that this 
department was largest formal law producer among all ministries. For these ministries we can 
conclude that the transposition patterns they display can be traced back to their ways of 
legislating rules in general. Surprising, however, is the case of the Ministry of Education. This 
ministry is criticized for over-producing decrees, i.e. circulars, a pattern also found by De 
Jong and Herweijer (2004: 227-228). As regards the transposition of  EU directives, this 
ministry has used laws more often than decrees. 
The ministries regulating corporatist policy sectors, finally and as expected, most often 
used PBO-decrees: Social Affairs and Employment, Agriculture, and Economic Affairs. From 
a comparative perspective, this expected outcome is of course quite remarkable. This means 
that European policies concerning industrial policies and internal market are largely co-
governed by interest groups. Interest groups in the Netherlands are formally integrated in the 
formulation and (here) implementation of EU policies (Dijkstra et al 1995), whereas in, for 
example, Denmark interest groups have been deliberately kept out from the EU arenas as the 
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country entered the EEC, because the EU demands that only official civil servants partake in 
the formulation and execution of EU policies (see Hjelmar 2003). 
 
-- Table 2b about here – 
 
 5.4 The National Impact of EU Directives 
 
But how much is the legislative output of this and the other ministries actually affected by EU 
directives? The total amount of legislative output by individual ministries does not entirely 
stem from the transposition of EU directives. There is still substantial room for national 
legislative production, as the Danish and British studies have shown, and the question here is 
how much Dutch legislation actually finds its source in the EU. Or: to what extent is the 80%-
myth true for the Netherlands? For the calculation of the EU-impact we only looked at formal 
laws and royal decrees. The reason why we left out ministerial decrees and PBO-decrees is 
that the laws and royal decrees are generally binding legal instruments, with the most and 
broadest impact on Dutch citizens and enterprises. Moreover, we also would have had a 
problem of measurement if we would have wanted to include PBO-decrees, as figures about 
this instrument was not available at the legal databases on internet at the time we collected our 
data. 
 
-- Table 3 about here – 
 
Table 3 immediately reveals that, except for agriculture, the 80%-myth is definitively 
a myth. Agricultural policy-making in the Netherlands is European policy-making. 
Furthermore, the table shows that the Ministry of Traffic and Waterworks’ legislative output 
consists for more than 60% of transposition laws and royal decrees, which makes this ministry 
a highly Europeanised ministry, something about which we on the basis of the previous 
results we should not be surprised about. However, more than 60-70 % of all legislation of the 
remaining ministries is a nationally produced law or royal decree.  
If we calculate the overall impact, we find for laws 18%, for royal decrees 28%; and 
for both 25%. This means that of all the national general binding rules that were in force on 
31 July 2003, 75% was ‘home made’. Of course this is a somewhat distorted figure, as we 
also have included the impact ratios of ministries and policy areas that fall outside the first 
pillar. If we take only those policy areas falling under the first pillar, we get an overall impact 
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of 38%.14 This is still impressively lower than the impact figures estimated by other scholars 
and uttered in public debates.  
Finally, how do these figures for the Netherlands compare with those of Denmark? 
Remind that our data are collected in an identical fashion. Table 4 ranks and compares the 
impact ratios of the core ministries for both countries.  
 
-- Table 4 about here -- 
 
We immediately see that the largest impact figure for Denmark is substantially lower than for 
the Netherlands: 27.3 % for Agriculture (i.e. Department of Food Stuffs). A large gap also 
exists between Netherlands’ second-ranked department and its Danish counterpart, the 
Ministry of Traffic (63.2 % against 21.5 %). Despite the closeness of the Danish Employment 
Department and the Dutch Social Affairs and Employment Department (about 20%), there 
exist substantial distances in impact ratios between counterpart departments. Not all Danish 
ministries are included here (see Blom-Hansen and Christensen 2003: 68), but the overall 
impact figure substantially lower for Denmark is 9.6% (primary and secondary laws). Even 
when we exclude the ministries with 0-impact ratios and those outside the first pillar (e.g. the 
Ministry for Churches, Prime Mkinister’s office, etc) the impact ratio remains still as low as 
13.3 %. 
However, we should be cautious with this list, as the figures are not directly comparable. 
First, as one sees are ministerial jurisdictions different in both countries. For example, 
Denmark has a Ministry for Asylum Seekers and Immigrants in 2003, an area that in the 
Netherlands is dealt with by the Ministry of Justice. A next example is environment: Denmark 
has a distinct ministry for this area, whereas this in the Netherlands is a part of a ministry that 
also harbours housing and spatial planning. Other differences have to do with the location of 
authority for certain policy issues. In Denmark, health care and education belong to the 
exclusive competence of local government (e.g. the Ministry of Interior Affairs and Health 
Care), whereas in the Netherlands policy-making in these areas is in the hands of the central 
government. Perhaps a more fundamental caveat may be the fact that because Denmark 
entered the EU in 1973, it has lesser directives than the Netherlands: through endorsing the 
acquis communitaire, Denmark transposed several directives at once. Finally, again pointing 
out to the finding of De Jong and Herweijer (2004), it may be the case that Danish rules 
contain more articles than Dutch rules, herewith bringing down the total number of transposed 
rules as compared to the Netherlands. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Debunking has not been the main or sole purpose of conducting this study. But still, together 
with the Danish, British and the forthcoming Austrian study on legislative impact our study 
contributes to the debunking of the 80% - myth that has become a mantra in political science 
and European politics. National states in the EU enjoy more legislative autonomy than was 
hitherto claimed. However, we repeat, we have only examined the impact of directives and 
neglected for practical reasons other formal as well as much subtler mechanisms of 
Europeanisation.  
 There are a number of caveats, indeed. The first is that what is measured here are 
numbers of rules. As De Jong and Herweijer (2004) show, the impact of individual rules may 
be mitigated by the number of articles that each rule contains. This is an important caveat to 
remember when international comparisons of impact figures are to be made. For example, the 
Jong/Herweijer study found that the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture made extensively use of 
ministerial decrees, but with an average of 5 articles. It is quite possible that agriculture 
ministries in Denmark (27.3% !) and Austria have issued relatively few rules but with a large 
number of articles. Second, we have only measured the formal impact of European directives, 
not the material impact. Rules differ from each other with regard to the social and economic 
costs they impose on citizens or firms. Some of the transposition rules may be more important 
than other transposition rules. Third, we do not know whether the directives are materially 
more important than the national rules. Again, we have not assessed the material impact of 
transposition rules, and we also have not examined the material significance of the national 
rules. It is thus possible that the directives and the rules through which they have been 
transposed are significantly more important, materially, than the majority of national rules. 
 A final important caveat we mention here is that we have only measured a single point 
in time. We do not know whether our findings fit a within a trend or not. It could be possible 
that by choosing July 2003 as our point of measurement, that we missed a ‘golden age’ of 
European impact on national legislation. Studies of rule production at the supranational level 
do point at the possibility that we missed such an age. Blom-Hansen and Christensen show 
that the number of regulations issued by the EU has dropped from 1600 in 1986 to 800 in 
2002 (2003: 37-38). Similar findings emanate from the study of Maurer et al (2003: 62). They 
have found that rule production at the EU level has peaked in 1986/1987. From this year 
onward, they registered a step-by-step decline of legal output and a sharp decline from 1998 
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onwards, a trend which they ascribe to a decline in agricultural, trade and customs legislation. 
With 2003, we are clearly in the low end of this trend. Unfortunately, the electronic legal 
databases that we can use to examine the legal impact of the EU have no digital records that 
go beyond 1995. This makes examining the possible existence of a ‘golden age’ quite a costly 
enterprise. 
 Apart from these caveats, there exists empirical evidence for the decline of the golden 
age. It may thus well be the case that soft law and the open method of coordination have 
partly taken over the place of regulations and directives, allowing the national states to 
reclaim a fair share of formal legislative autonomy. 
 
   
 19
List of References  
 
Bergman, Torbjörn and Erik Damgaard (eds.) (2000). Delegation and Accountability in 
European Integration. London: Frank Cass. 
Blom-Hansen, Jens & Joergen Gronnegard Christensen (2004), Den Europaeiske forbindelse, 
Aarhus: Magtudredningen. 
Börzel, Tanja and Thomas Risse (2003). Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe. In: 
Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (eds.) (2003). The Politics of Europeanisation. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 57-80. 
Bursens, Peter (2002). Why Denmark and Belgium Have Different Implementation Records: 
On Transposition Laggards and Leaders in the EU, Scandinavian Political Studies, 25 (2): 
173-195. 
Cowles, Maria Green, James Caporaso, and Thomas Risse (eds.) (2001). Transforming 
Europe: Europeanisation and Domestic Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Dijkstra, G.S.A., F.M. van der Meer, and J.W. van der Meer (eds.) (1995). Produktschappen 
en bedrijfsschappen onderzocht: Het functioneren van bedrijfslichamen als intermediair 
bestuur. Alphen a/d Rijn: Samsom H.D. Tjeenk Willink. 
Dijstelbloem, Huub, Cock Hazeu en Frank den Hond (2004), ‘Een Zaak van Niveau. De 
Schakelfunctie van de Nationale Overheid in het Europese Milieubeleid’, Beleidswetenschap, 
Jrg. 18, Nr. 2, pp. 99-117, citaat op pag. 103. 
Francino, Fabio (2001), ‘Delegation and Constraints in the National Execution of the EC 
Policies: A Longitudinal and Qualitative Analysis’, West European Politics, 24, 4 (October 
2001): 169-192. 
Falkner, Gerda (2003), ‘Comparing Europeanisation Effects: From Metaphor to 
Operationalisation’, paper for the ECPR General Conference Marburg, 18-21 September 
2001. 
Falkner, Gerda, Oliver Treib, Mirian Hartlapp, and Simone Leiber (2005), Complying with 
Europe? The Impact of EU Minimum Harmonisation and Soft Law in the Member States, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (forthcoming) 
Featherstone, Kevin and Claudio Radaelli (eds.) (2003). The Politics of Europeanisation. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Golub, J. (1999), ‘In the Shadow of the Vote? Decisonmaking in the European Community’, 
International Organization, 53: 733-764. 
 20
Gourevitch, P. (1978), ‘The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic 
Politics’, International Organization, 32 (4): 881-912. 
Hanf, Kenneth and Ben Soetendorp (eds.) (1998). Adapting to European Integration: Small 
States and the Euroepan Union. London and New York: Longman. 
Haverland, Markus (2000). National Adaptation to European Integration: The Importance of 
Institutional Veto Points. Journal of Public Policy, 20 (1): 83-103. 
Haverland, Markus (2003). Methodological Issues in Europeanisation Research: The ‘No 
Variation’ Problem. Paper for the ECPR General Conference Marburg, 18-21 September 
2001. 
Héritier, Adrienne, Christoph Knill, and Susanne Mingers (1996). Ringing the Changes in 
Europe. Regulatory Competition and the Transformation of the State. Berlin: De Gruyter. 
Hix, Simon (1999). The Political System of the European Union. New York: Palgrave 
Holzacker, Ronald (2002), ‘National Parliamentary Scrutiny over EU Issues: Comparing the 
Goals and Methods of Governing and Opposition Parties’, European Union Politics, 3 (4): 
459-479. 
Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (2001). Multi-Level Governance and European Integration. 
Boston: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
Immergut, Ellen (1992). Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kassim, Hussein, B. Guy Peters, and Vincent Wright (eds.) (2003). The National 
Coordination of EU Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Knill, Christoph and Dirk Lehmkuhl (2002). The National Impact of European union 
Regulatory Policy: Three Europeanisation Mechanisms. European Journal of Political 
Research, 41: 255-280. 
Lampinen, Risto and Petri Uusikylä (1998). Implementation Deficit – Why Member States 
Do Not Comply with EU Directives. Scandinavian Political Studies, 21 (3): 231 – 251. 
Mair, Peter (2004), ‘The Europeanisation Dimension’, Review Section, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 11 (2): 337-348. 
Majone, Giandomenico (1996), Regulating Europe, London and New York: Routledge 
Mastenbroek, Ellen (2002), ‘The Legal Aspects of EU Implementation’, Paper University of 
Leiden. 
Mastenbroek, Ellen (2003), ‘Surviving the Deadline: The Transposition of EU Directives in 
the Netherlands’, European Union Politics, 4, 4:371-395. 
 21
Maurer, Andreas, Jürgen Mittag, and Wolfgang Wessels (2003), ‘National Systems’ 
Adaptation to the EU System: Trends, Offers, and Constraints’, in: Beatrice Kohler-Koch 
(ed.), Linking EU and National Governance, New York: Oxford university Press. 
Moravcsik, Andrew (1993). Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmental Approach. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31 (4): 473-524. 
Olsen, Johan P. (2002). The Many Faces of Europanization. Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 40 (5): 921-952. 
Page, Edward (1998), ‘The Impact of European Legislation on British Public Policy Making: 
A Research Note’, Public Administration, 76 (winter): 803-809. 
Page, Edward C and Linda Wouters (1995). The Europeanisation of National Bureaucracies? 
In: Jon Pierre (ed.). Bureaucracy in the Modern State: Problems of Theory and Method. 
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, pp. 185-204. 
Peters, B. Guy (1997). The Commission and Implementation in the European Union: Is There 
an Implementation Deficit and Why? In: Nugent, Neill (ed.), At the Heart of the Union. 
MacMillan/St. Martin’s Press, pp. 187-202. 
Richardson, Jeremy (1996). Eroding EU Politics: Implementation Gaps, Cheating and 
Resteering. In: Jeremy Richardson (ed.), European Union: Power and Policy-Making, 
London: Routledge, pp. 278-94. 
Richardson, Jeremy (2001), ‘Policy-Making in the EU. Interests, Ideas and Garbage Cans of 
Primeval Soup’, in: J. Richardson (ed.) European Union. Power and Policy-Making, 2nd ed., 
London and New York: Routledge, pp. 3-26. 
Schmidt, V.A. (2002), ‘Does Discourse Matter in the Politics of Welfare State Adjustment?’, 
Comparative Political Studies, 35, 2, 168-193. 
Sciarini, Pascal, Alex Fisher, and Sarah Nicolet (2004), ‘How Europe Hits Home: Evidence 
from the Swiss Case’, Journal of European Public Policy, 11 (3): 353 – 378. 
Siedentopf, Heinrich and Jacques Ziller (eds.) (1988), Making European Policies Work: The 
Implementation of Community Legislation in the Member States, Vols. 1 and 2, Bruxelles: 
Bruylant – Sage Publications. 
Tallberg, Jonas (2002). Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European 
Union. International Organization, 56(3), pp. 609-643. 
Treib, Oliver (2003). Die Umsetzung von EU-Richtlinien im Zeichen der Parteipoliti: Eine 
akteurzentrierte Antwort auf die Msifit-These. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 44 (4): 506 – 
528 
 22
Vink, Maarten (2003), ‘What is Europeanisation? And other questions on a new research 
agenda’, European Political Science 3, 1 (autumn 2003): 63-74. 
Zito, Anthony R., Claudio M. Radaelli, and Andrew Jordan (2003). Introduction to the 
Symposium on ‘New’ Policy Instruments in the European Union. Public Administration, 81 
(3): 509-511. 
 23
Figure 1. EU directives per grouped policy area
People´s Europe
Law relating to unde
Environmental policy
Industial policy and
Energy
3rd country relation
Tax policy
Competition policy
Transport
Free movement of ser
Free movement for wo
Fisheries
Agricultural policy
Customs union and fr
General, institution
P
er
ce
nt
30
20
10
0
 
Figure 2. Distribution of transposition rules over national ministries
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Table 1. The dispersal of transposition rules over ministries, July 2003 (percentages) 
EU policy area Most affected 
ministry 
Second most 
affected ministry  
Third most affected 
ministry 
Total number of 
national rules
General, institutional 
and financial issues 
Interior Affairs (66.7) Housing, Spatial 
Planning & 
Environment (33.3) 
 3
Customs union and 
free movement of 
goods 
Finance (51.4) Agriculture, Nature 
Management & 
Fisheries (43.2) 
Justice; Education, 
Culture & Sciences 
(2.7)  
37
Agricultural policy Agriculture, Nature 
Management & 
Fisheries (71.7) 
Health, Welfare & 
Sports (19.5) 
Social Affairs & 
Employment (6.4) 
769
Fisheries Agriculture, Nature 
Management & 
Fisheries (100) 
  1
Free movement for 
workers and social 
affairs 
Social Affairs & 
Employment (45.0) 
Economic Affairs 
(11.9) 
Traffic & Waterworks 
(11.5) 
218
Free movement of 
services and right of 
establishment 
Finance (36.0) Economic Affairs 
(18.0) 
Traffic & Waterworks 
(15.9) 
283
Transport Traffic & Waterworks 
(92.1) 
Finance/Housing, 
Spatial Planning & 
Environment (2.5) 
 202
Competition policy Traffic & Waterworks 
(70.6) 
Economic Affairs 
(29.4) 
 17
Tax policy Finance (98.3) Justice (1.7)  60
Third country 
relations 
Finance (100)   2
Energy Economic Affairs 
(61.9) 
Housing, Spatial 
Planning & 
Environment (14.3) 
Traffic & 
Waterworks/Health, 
Welfare & Sports 
(9.5) 
21
Industrial policy and 
internal market 
Traffic & Waterworks 
(38.0) 
Health, Welfare & 
Sports (23.9) 
Agriculture, Nature 
Management & 
Fisheries (9.8) 
844
Environmental 
policy, consumer 
and health protection 
Housing, Spatial 
Planning & 
Environment (51.7) 
Agriculture, Nature 
Management & 
Fisheries (24.5) 
Health, Welfare & 
Sports (9.6) 
302
Laws relating to 
enterprises 
Justice (82.6) Economic Affairs 
(13.0) 
Education, Culture & 
Sciences (4.3) 
23
People’s Europe Justice (61.5) Interior Affairs (30.8) Foreign Affairs (7.7) 13
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Table 2a. Types of national rules (overall), 
                July 2003 
Type of rule N Percentage 
Law 361 11.3 
Royal decree 1001 31.4 
Ministerial decree 1451 45.5 
PBO-decree 176 5.5 
Other 198 6.2 
Total 3187 100 
 
 
 
 
Table 2b. Type of national rule used for transposition per ministry, July 2003 
 
  Type of national rule 
 
  
 Law 
Royal 
Decree  
Ministerial 
Decree 
PBO 
decree Others Total 
Prime 
Minister’s 
Office 
12.5% 12.5% .0% 50.0% 25.0% 8 
Foreign 
Affairs .0% 33.3% 33.3% .0% 33.3% 3 
Interior Affairs 20.6% 41.2% 23.5% .0% 14.7% 34 
Defense .0% 50.0% 50.0% .0% .0% 2 
Economic 
Affairs 8.1% 33.0% 47.7% 6.1% 5.1% 197 
Finance 30.6% 16.6% 51.3% .0% 1.6% 193 
Justice 34.3% 20.4% 36.1% .0% 9.3% 108 
Agriculture, 
Nature 
Management 
& Fisheries 
6.0% 22.9% 57.1% 12.4% 1.5% 728 
Education, 
Culture & 
Sciences 
36.0% 36.0% 24.0% .0% 4.0% 25 
Social Affairs 
& 
Employment 
11.4% 30.0% 28.2% 30.0% .5% 220 
Traffic & 
Waterworks 8.3% 32.0% 56.3% 2.3% 1.0% 600 
Health, 
Welfare & 
Sports  
4.8% 33.3% 58.3% 2.2% 1.4% 417 
Housing, 
Spatial 
Planning & 
Environment 
9.2% 38.7% 50.2% .0% 1.9% 261 
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Table 3. Impact of European directives on laws and royal decrees, July 2003 
 Laws Royal decrees Total 
Ministry EU % N = 100% EU % N = 100% EU % N = 100%
General Affairs 
 
2.4 42 0.9 112 1.3 154
Foreign Affairs 
 
0 53 2.9 34 1.1 87
Interior Affairs 
 
3.2 222 4.2 334 3.8 556
Defense 
 
0 32 0.7 145 0.6 177
Economic Affairs 
 
18.4 87 48.1 135 36.5 222
Finance 
 
26.9 219 20.6 155 24.3 374
Justice 
 
12.4 299 7.5 293 10.0 592
Agriculture. 
Natural 
Resources & 
Fisheries 
 
74.6 59 87.9 190 84.7 249
Education. 
Culture & 
Science 
5.4 166 2.5 363 3.4 529
 
Social Affairs & 
Employment 
14.7 170 29.5 224 23.1 394
 
Traffic & 
Waterworks 
38.5 130 75.9 253 63.2 383
 
Health. Welfare 
& Sports 
15.5 129 39.7 350 33.2 479
 
Housing. Spatial 
Planning & 
Environment  
24.7 97 42.1 240 37.1 337
 
Table 4. Comparative findings impact ratios, Denmark & the Netherlands 
Denmark The Netherlands 
Agriculture (27.3%) Agriculture (84.7%) 
Employment (22.4%) Traffic and Waterworks (63.2%) 
Economic & Industrial Affairs (21.8%) Housing, Spatial Planning & Environment (37.1%) 
Traffic (21.5%) Economic Affairs (36.5%) 
Sciences & Technology (20.5%) Health, Welfare & Sports (33.2%) 
Environment (19.3%) Finance (24.3%) 
Treasury (11.2%) Social Affairs & Employment (23.1%) 
Asylum Seekers & Immigrants (8.0%) Justice (10.0%) 
Justice (7.1%) Interior Affairs (3.8%) 
Interior Affairs and Health (5.9%) Education, Culture & Sciences (3.4%) 
Source Danish figures: Blom-Hansen & Christensen, p. 68
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 We are especially thankful to our research assistants Sebastiaan Steenman and Sjoerd Hogenbirk for coding the 
data, as well as to our colleague Sebastiaan Princen for his comments, information, and advice. All mistakes are 
ours, of course. 
2 Next to members states, European integration has also an evident impact on non-member states, such as 
Norway and Switzerland, and the Eastern European states before accession. 
3 A similar problematique can be found in New Public Management studies. NPM is best described as a soft 
form of internationalization as it concerns the spread and penetration of international business and management 
ideas by national administrative systems (see for a comparison with Europeanisation Knill 2001). 
4 They discern (1) the preparatory phase, (2) the incorporation phase and (3) the phase of administrative 
enforcement and control. 
5 To prevent overstretch, we do not discuss the recent debate about the salience of the central misfit-thesis in 
domestic impact variants of Europeanisation studies. There is growing disagreement among Europeanists as to 
what the mechanism of Europeanisation are, or, especially, to what extent the ‘misfit’-thesis is viable or not 
(Falkner et al 2005 forthcoming; Treib 2003). For a period, there seemed to have existed consensus on the basic 
mechanisms of Europeanisation (Héritier et  al1996; Knill & Lehmkuhl 2002; Börzel & Risse 2003): that 
adaptation requires a “mismatch” (or: “misfit”) between European directives and the domestic policies, politics, 
and polity in force at the time of the enactment of the European directive. Without a “mismatch” between 
European and domestic policies, there is no “adaptation pressure” and hence no impact on domestic policies, 
politics or polity. Others have argued and demonstrated that adaptation occurred in circumstances where there 
was no misfit between directives’ requirements and the national status quo (Treib 2003; Falkner et al 2005). 
6 The authors thank Sebastiaan Princen for providing us the references to the ‘80%-claim’ throughout the 
literature. 
7 The exact citation is: ‘Empirically, it is beyond dispute that the EU level is now the level at which a high 
proportion of what used to be regarded as purely domestic policy-making takes place. Hix suggests that the EU 
sets over 80 per cent of the rules governing the exchange of goods, services and capital in the member states' 
markets (Hix 1999: 3)’ (Richardson 2001: 4). 
8Majone refers to Conseil d'Etat: Report of the Conseil d'Etat 1992, Paris: Documentation Francaise.  Thanks to 
Sebastiaan Princen for this detail. 
9 These categories are: 01: General, institutional and financial issues; 02: Customs union and free movement of 
goods; 03: Agricultural policy; 04: Fisheries; 05: Free movement for workers and social affairs; 06: Free 
movement for services and right of establishment; 07: Transport; 08: Competition policy; 09: Tax policy; 10: 
Economic and monetary policy; 11: 3rd country relations; 12: Energy; 13: Industrial policy and internal market; 
14: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments; 15: Environmental policy, consumer and health 
protection; 16: Research, information, education and culture; 17: Law relating to enterprises; 18: Common 
foreign and security policy; 19: Area of freedom, security and justice; 20: People’s Europe.  
10 Following the Danish scheme, we distinguish between six types of regulatory functions: (1) economic 
regulation; (2) social regulation; (3) general legal regulation; (4) redistribution, subsidies and transfers; (5) 
provision and production of services; and (6) coordination. 
11 Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds. 
12 Also in third country relations, but there are only directives in that domain. 
13 Table 2b counts lesser national rules than in table 2a, because of a large number of national rules the enacting 
ministry was missing in Europmaat. 
14 We exclude the Ministry of Justice although it has transposed directives related to the internal market, such 
laws relating to enterprises. If it had been included, our impact figure would have decreased to 35%. 
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